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In this paper 1 formulate an approach for evaluating probabilistic forecasts 
in terms of signal detection theory. Signal detection theory provides a powerful 
perspective for this type of problem, and a rich empirical background including 
methodological tools as well as an extensive body of research in many do- 
mains. 1 propose procedures which emphasize the maximization of expected 
utility for the decision maker who uses the forecasts. Further, 1 suggest ap- 
proaches to obtaining indices of calibration and resolution within this frame- 
work. I also present arguments that the proposed indices will exhibit the same 
basic properties as do decompositions of Brier’s (1950, Monthly Weather Re- 
view, 78, 1-3) mean probability score. However, the properties may be re- 
flected in different ways, and hence, the present methods may lead to different 
conclusions about forecasting ability. Finally, I argue thal the use of an ex- 
pected utility loss function makes this approach more appropriate for practical 
applications as well as for theoretical research than other procedures with 
more arbitrary loss functions. 0 1985 Academic Press, Inc. 
Probabilistic inferences and forecasts are often a critical component of 
any decision making situation. Decisions to buy or sell, operate or not 
operate, attack or negotiate, buy insurance or take a risk, bet on the 
Yankees or the Dodgers, and an endless number of other decisions, 
ranging from routine daily decisions of individuals to world-shaping de- 
cisions of societies and governments, will often depend on inferences and 
predictions about uncertain or future states of the world. In many situ- 
ations the decision maker seeks the advice or opinion of an expert in 
regard to these uncertain states of the world. This paper is concerned 
with the evaluation of such forecasts from the perspective of the decision 
maker who wants to utilize the forecasts for making a decision. 
The evaluation procedures to be presented here will emphasize the 
practical value of the forecasts for the decision maker who uses them. 
This emphasis leads to the use of expected utility loss functions. The 
particular emphasis of this paper will be to develop expected utility eval- 
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uation procedures in the signal detection pardigm. Signal detection theory 
offers a powerful conceptual perspective and many empirical tools for 
this type of problem. I will further argue that the use of such loss func- 
tions is not only important for practical applications but also for theoret- 
ical concerns about underlying processes and abilities involved in prob- 
abilistic forecasts. 
The evaluation procedures will focus on two main issues. The first is 
how should a given decision maker choose a forecaster from whom pre- 
dictions will be obtained. The second is how can different skills involved 
in making probabilistic predictions be characterized. Two specific skills 
will be considered. One is the ability to place events into distinct cate- 
gories depending on their outcome. For example, one wants a weather 
forecaster to be able to accurately separate weather into categories such 
as “Rain” or “No Rain.” The second skill is forecasters’ ability to ac- 
curately quantify this uncertainty. For example, one expects that there 
will be rain on a large majority of the days for which there was a 90% 
chance of rain forecast. 
An issue with which this paper is not explicitly concerned is coercing 
the forecaster to give honest forecasts. This contrasts with the main- 
stream literature on scoring rules for probabilistic forecasts which deals 
principally with “proper” scoring rules. Proper scoring rules are those 
for which forecasters can maximize their expected score only by giving 
an honest forecast. It has long been recognized that this property is only 
relevant to the elicitation of forecasts, not their evaluation (Murphy & 
Winkler, 1970; Winkler, 1969). Therefore, the popularity of proper rules 
as evaluation measures is probably due to their decomposition properties 
rather than their properness. That is, some of these scoring rules can be 
decomposed into terms which reflect the forecasting skills mentioned 
above. For example, Sanders (1963), Murphy (1973), and Yates (1982) 
have all developed decompositions of a particular rule, the “mean prob- 
ability score (I?)” (Brier, 1950). This rule is simply a squared error loss 
function of predictions and outcomes. Specifically, the score is the av- 
erage of the difference between the forecast probability and a O-l out- 
come index. For example, suppose a weather forecaster predicted 30,60, 
and 90% chances of rain on 3 consecutive days. If it rained on the first 
and third days the mean probability score would be [(.3-1)2 + (.6-O)2 
+ (.9-1)21/3 = .287. A smaller score is better. 
Sanders (1963) and Murphy (1973) have shown that Tis can be parti- 
tioned into terms reflecting the concepts of resolution and calibration. 
According to these decompositions, a well-resolved forecaster never as- 
signs the same probability to events with different outcomes. For ex- 
ample, suppose all the occasions on which an event occurred had been 
assigned probabilities of .l, 5, or .9, and all the occasions on which it 
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did not occur were assigned probabilities .2, .6, or 3. This forecaster 
would receive a perfect resolution score. 
Whereas resolution is reflective of a forecaster’s substantive expertise 
in the sense of distinguishing between outcomes, calibration is a measure 
of how adept the forecaster is at assigning numerical probabilities. In the 
traditional sense, a well-calibrated forecaster assigns probabilities such 
that, for a set of equally likely events, the proportion of events which 
occur is the same as the assigned probability. 
Although these decompositions provide interesting indices of fore- 
casting abilities, it is not at all clear that a decision maker should use a 
rule such as I?3 for evaluating forecasts and selecting among forecasters. 
The problem is that the squared error loss function of i?!? may simply not 
be optimal for different decision makers. Different individuals undoubt- 
ably have different attitudes and preferences about the type and magni- 
tude of errors they are willing to tolerate. 
The procedures of this paper will take such individual differences into 
account, and they will also provide indices of resolution and calibration 
skills. These indices are closely related to the traditional indices of I% 
decompositions. However, certain unreasonable situations, such as the 
earlier resolution example, are eliminated. Another difference is that 
the present approach combines these indices into the total evaluation so 
as to maximize the decision maker’s utility. Thus, it is possible that the 
resolution and calibration indices a forecaster receives from the present 
procedures and FS decompositions could be very similar, but the overall 
evaluations could be very different. 
The importance of using a suitable loss function for empirical studies 
of forecasting was illustrated in a study of self-judged knowledge (Yates, 
1982). This study found that people’s self-judged knowledge about the 
events in concern was a very poor predictor of the external correspon- 
dence of their forecasts as measured by I?$. The question remains 
whether the subjects actually had poor self-insight, or whether m was 
simply a poor measure of external correspondence. It is hypothesized 
that the current evaluations would be much more predictive of self-judged 
knowledge. There was evidence in the Yates study that subjects with 
little self-judged knowledge were fortuituously well-calibrated (their fore- 
casts of .5 turned out to be a good estimate of the base rate), whereas 
subjects with more self-judged knowledge were not well-calibrated in 
terms of the base rate. Since base-rate calibration is a factor in R, these 
effects may have obscured the ability of subjects with higher self-judged 
knowledge to differentiate between occurrences of the different outcome 
events. 
Indeed, a reanalysis of the Yates data by the present author showed 
that the covariance term S,, of the decomposition was predictive of self- 
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judged knowledge. This term is an important factor in the present signal 
detection evaluations-it measures the mean separation of the distribu- 
tions . 
A study by Morris (1982) illustrates the significance of a suitable loss 
function in an applied context. He found that, although subjects scored 
poorly according to a calibration measure, they did quite well according 
to a certain operational evaluation. Thus, the above studies demonstrate 
that it is important to have a suitable loss function for both applied and 
theoretical evaluations. 
There are several groups of papers which have dealt with expected 
utility evaluations for scoring rules. In the 1950s meteorologists mini- 
mized expected monetary loss over a series of decisions about whether 
or not to prepare for adverse weather (Gringorten, 1959; Thompson, 1952; 
Thompson & Brier, 1955). Murphy (1966, 1969a, 1969b, 1976, 1977) has 
published a series of papers dealing with the relationships of proper 
scoring rules and expected utility. In particular, Murphy (1966) shows 
that a certain “expected utility” measure is equivalant to fis. Such a 
result would justify the use of i% for selecting which forecaster to employ. 
However, Murphy’s expected utility measure is a very restricted case 
because it is assumed to be linear with monetary losses and is averaged 
over a number of situations. Hence, it is really an expected value mea- 
sure, similar to the earlier work. Further, Murphy’s derivation of equiv- 
alence involves assuming that the losses which are to be minimized are 
uniformly distributed random variables. In contrast, the present evalua- 
tion methods use general von Neumann and Morgenstern (N-M) utilities 
and are applicable to specific utility functions as well as random or av- 
erage utility functions. 
Savage (1971) proposed what he called the “share-of-the business” 
scoring rule. The basic idea of this rule was to give the forecaster a 
percentage of the profits (or losses) that the decision maker incurred. 
Closely related to this idea is a large body of literature in economics 
known as “agency theory” (e.g., see Grossman & Hart, 1983; Harris & 
Raviv, 1978; Stiglitz, 1974). This theory involves a principle-agent model 
where the principle (or decision maker in the present context) wants some 
output (e.g., a forecast) from the agent. Agency theory deals with the 
design of optimal incentive schemes which take into account the decision 
maker’s utility function and the agent’s costs for providing the desired 
service. Thus, both the share-of-the-business rule and agency theory 
involve expected utility considerations. However, neither is directly con- 
cerned with evaluating forecast quality, but rather they deal with forecast 
elicitation. 
More closely related to the present paper are previous papers where 
forecasts are revised in accordance with Bayes’ rule (Lindley, 1982; Lind- 
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ley, Tversky, & Brown, 1979; Morris, 1974, 1977). Lindley’s approach 
(1982), especially the frequency evaluation, is most closely related to this 
paper. Both involve frequency distributions of forecasts as functions of 
dichotomous outcomes. The main contribution of this paper is to put the 
problem in a signal detection perspective. 
The paradigmatic problem of signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 
1974) is the decision of whether an observation came from one of two 
distributions. Green and Swets (1974) showed that the basic likelihood 
ratio decision rule of signal detection theory has as special cases almost 
all commonly used decision rules. In particular, depending on the choice 
of a constant, the likelihood ratio rule will maximize any weighted com- 
bination of hits and false alarms, percentage correct, the Neyman- 
Pearson objective, and of course, expected utility as in the decision anal- 
ysis paradigm. The value of signal detection theory in the present context 
is that it offers a powerful perspective and language for this type of 
problem. Further, a large body of empirical tools and research has been 
developed in this paradigm over the last 20 years. The goal of the present 
paper is to apply some of these tools for the evaluation of probabilistic 
forecasts, and in particular to propose procedures for obtaining indices 
of resolution and calibration within this framework. 
In an independent development, an Australian meteorologist (Mason, 
1982) has also come up with the idea of using a signal detection framework 
for evaluating probabilistic forecasts. Mason’s concern was mainly to 
have an index of performance which was independent of the numerical 
properties of the forecasts-i.e., one that ignored the calibration of the 
forecasts. In contrast, the approach of this paper makes great use of the 
actual numbers used by the forecaster. Essentially, Mason proposes what 
is equivalent to the third procedure of this paper-using the area under 
the ROC curve as an index of resolution. He does not include the ex- 
pected utility justifications of the present paper, but he does present em- 
pirical evidence concerning normality of underlyng distributions. Those 
data argue for the practicality of implementing the proposed signal de- 
tection-based procedures. 
SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY FRAMEWORK 
A basic assumption of signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1974) 
is that the performance of the detector can be explained in terms of two 
underlying distributions. In the classical situation one distribution rep- 
resents random noise, and the other represents random noise with a signal 
added to it. A natural distribution for random noise is the normal distri- 
bution. Since the other distribution is just noise with a signal added, it is 
also assumed to be normal with the same variance but a different mean. 
The present procedures also postulate two underlying distributions. but 
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they are not assumed to be normal. However, it will be assumed that the 
two distributions are on a scale which monotonic in the likelihood ratio 
of the distributions. This is also a basic assumption in the standard signal 
detection paradigm. In the present case the underlying scale which is 
monotonic with the likelihood ratio will be called a “strength of evi- 
dence”scale. One distribution will represent the perceived strength of 
evidence which was present when an event occurred, and the other will 
represent the perceived strength of evidence when the event did not 
occur. 
It will also be assumed that the forecaster reports a higher probability 
for the event with the larger likelihood ratio. Thus, since the likelihood 
ratio has been assumed to be monotonic with strength of evidence, the 
above assumption is equivalent to saying that the event with greater 
strength of evidence will always be given a higher forecast probability. 
For example, if one were predicting the outcomes of baseball games in 
terms of home teams winning, then the games for which the evidence 
most favored the home team would receive the higher probabilities. 
In the classical signal detection paradigm the detector must report 
“Yes, there is a signal”or “No, there is no signal, only noise.” There 
are four possible results: (a) a signal is reported and actually occurred 
(called a “hit”); (b) a signal is reported even though it had not been 
present (called a “false alarm” (FA)); (c) a signal is not reported, nor 
was one present (called a “correct rejection” (CR)); (d) a signal was not 
reported, although one was present (called a “miss”). 
Note that, of the times a signal was present, the proportion of hits is 
equal to one minus the proportion of misses. The same relationship holds 
for FAs and CRs when a signal was not present. Thus, we can summarize 
this information as a point in a two-dimensional space with proportion of 
hits on the vertical axis and proportion of FAs on the horizontal axis. 
Other points can be located in this space by altering the detector’s re- 
sponse criterion. The curve which is created by connecting these points 
is known as the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. Thus, the 
ROC curve shows the proportion of FAs which accompanies any level of 
hits. 
It is well known that ROC curves can also be generated directly from 
rating responses-which are essentially what a forecaster reports. An 
ROC curve is generated from a rating or forecast response by computing 
the proportions of hits and FAs which would occur for all likelihood ratio 
decision criteria. For example, suppose action A, was taken only if the 
probabilistic forecast was .99 or above. This would generate one point 
on the ROC curve-with lots of misses and CRs, undoubtedly. Other 
points would be generated for the criteria of .98 and above, .97 and above, 













FIG. 1. Outcome-action matrix showing the four possible outcomes of a dichotomous 
decision. Action A, corresponds to saying “yes,” A, to saying “no.” Outcome 0, corre- 
sponds to a signal being present, 0, corresponds to noise. 
by assuming that any event assigned a higher probability than the 
threshold would result in action A, being taken, and any event below the 
threshold would result in action A, being taken. Therefore, in addition to 
the earlier assumptions, it will also be assumed that decision makers 
follow a likelihood ratio decision rule in the sense that if they take action 
A, for some event, then they will also take action A, for any event with 
a higher forecast probability. This will ensure the equivalance of the rating 
and yes-no ROC curves. 
A basic property of signal detection theory is that it allows one to 
separate discrimination abilities from decision making biases. This prop- 
erty is directly utilized here in that two different people are used for the 
two tasks. The forecaster acts as the signal detector and produces the 
ROC curve. As will be seen later, the decision maker can then supply 
the utilities which determine the point of operation on the ROC curve. 
Even without assuming normal distributions, there are some desirable 
expected properties of the ROC curves. First, recall the assumptions that 
the strength of evidence scale and the likelihood ratio of the two distri- 
butions are monotonically related, and that a likelihood ratio decision 
rule is used. Using these assumptions it is easy to demonstrate that the 
slope of the ROC curve is equal to the likelihood ratio. This can be shown 
(e.g., Green & Swets, 1974, p. 38) by taking derivatives of the coordinates 
of the ROC curve. These derivatives are equal to the respective likeli- 
hoods. Thus, the ratio of the derivatives gives the slope and the likelihood 
ratio. Under these conditions, it is also well known that an ROC curve 
must have a hit probability which is a monotonically increasing function 
of the FA probability, and a slope that is monotonically decreasing. 
In summary, I have postulated that forecasters’ behavior can be de- 
scribed as if they mapped their information about events onto a strength 
KEITH LEVI 
of evidence scale. For a given forecaster, two distributions are created 
on this scale depending on which of the two possible outcomes occurs 
for each event. The basic assumptions about this scale and the distribu- 
tions are: 
(i) The scale is monotonic with the likelihood ratio of the two distri- 
butions. 
(ii) A forecaster’s reported probabilities are monotone with the likeli- 
hood ratios. 
(iii) A likelihood ratio decision rule is used. 
These assumptions have implied several necessary properties of the 
ROC curves which will be useful in the following evaluation procedures. 
EVALUATION PROCEDURES 
Three different evaluation procedures which use the signal detection 
framework will be presented next. Each is based on the maximization of 
expected utility (EU) for the user of the forecasts. The first and second 
are designed to apply to individual decision makers. The third can be 
used when considering a large group of decision makers with diverse or 
unknown utility functions. The first and third principally reflect the con- 
cept of resolution. The second involves the concept of calibration in 
addition to resolution. 
I will first provide summary descriptions of the three evaluation pro- 
cedures. Then, each procedure will be discussed in some detail. All three 
procedures assume that probabilistic forecasts have been given for a set 
of dichotomous events. and that the outcomes have been observed. 
Optimal EU Evaluation 
(a) Trace out the ROC curve for each forecaster, and find the optimal 
operating point on the curve. 
(b) Estimate the probability of a hit, miss, FA, or CR at this point. 
(c) Calculate the expected utility. 
Face-Value EU Evaluation 
(a) For each forecaster, estimate the probability of a hit, miss, FA, or 
CR using the decision rule: 
Act on 0, if 
r 2 (U2, - U12Y[W22 - u12) + (U,I - &,)I (1) 
where r is the forecasted probability of 0, occurring, and Uij is the de- 
cision maker’s utility for outcome i when he acts for outcome j. 
(b) Calculate the expected utility. 
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Area under the ROC Curve 
Trace out the ROC curve and find the area beneath it. 
Expected Utility Evaluations 
Basic principles and common assumptions. The basic principle under- 
lying the first two evaluation methods is the maximization of EU for the 
decision maker, in the following sense. Suppose a decision maker wants 
to choose one of several forecasters to predict the outcome of some event. 
If the forecasters have predicted outcomes for a number of similar events 
in the past, then ROC curves can be defined for each forecaster and the 
probabilities of a hit, miss, FA, or CR can be estimated for any particular 
decision rule. The decision maker’s EU for using each forecaster can 
then be calculated from these probabilities. These EUs are the fore- 
casters’ scores 
Distinction between optimal andface-value EU scores. Now, note that 
the estimated probabilities of hits and FAs depend on where one is on a 
forecaster’s ROC curve. That is, they depend on what decision rule is 
used. The two different EU evaluation procedures will correspond to the 
use of different decision rules by the decision maker. One rule will be to 
find the point on the obtained ROC curve which maximizes the decision 
maker’s EU. This rule will be called the “optimal EU evaluation rule.“ 
The other will be to use the forecaster’s reported probabilities at face 
value, and will be called the “face-value EU evaluation rule.” 
The decision maker takes forecasts at face value by using the fore- 
caster’s reported probabilities in computing whether the EU of taking act 
A, or A, is greater. This is in contrast to finding the optimal point on the 
ROC curve which implies the use of a decision rule which may not be 
the same as the face-value rule. The possible nonequivalence of these 
decision rules is demonstrated next. 
As I pointed out earlier, Green and Swets (1974) have shown that in 
the case of two-event outcomes, a likelihood ratio decision rule of the 
following form will maximize a number of decision criteria: “Prepare for 
outcome 0, if and only if the likelihood ratio is greater than some con- 
stant.” It is instructive to review the derivation of the decision threshold 
which maximizes EU and note its interpretation in the present situation. 
First, let 
CJij = utility of taking action i when outcome j occurs, 
r = reported probability that outcome 0, will occur. 
Then, given the reported forecast, the decision maker should take ac- 
tion A, if and only if 
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where 
p = [U,, - ~121~[~,1 - u211. 
If the decision maker takes the forecaster’s probabilities at face value 
then P(Ojlr) is equal to the forecaster’s reported posterior probability of 
outcome j occurring, given the forecaster’s perceived strength of evi- 
dence. That is, p(O,/r) = r and p(02/r) = I - r. Thus, (2) gives a decision 
rule based on posterior probabilities. Using Bayes’ Theorem, this can be 
transformed to a rule using the likelihood ratio and prior probabilities, as 
in (3). Thus, (2) and (3) specify decision rules of the form, “Take A, if 
and only if the ratio of posterior probabilities is at least as large as the 
decision threshold on the right side of (2), or if and only if the likelihood 
ratio is at least as large as the decision threshold on the right side of (3).” 
Now recall that the earlier assumptions about the strength of evidence 
distributions imply that the slope of the ROC curve is equal to the like- 
lihood ratio. Therefore, the point on the ROC curve where the slope 
equals the decision threshold in (3) gives the decision rule for which the 
decision maker will maximize expected utility. 
The question here is whether the rule implied by the optimal point on 
the ROC curve is equivalent, in the sense of producing the same out- 
comes, as the rule the decision maker would follow if he took the fore- 
casts at face value. The above derivation indicates a formal equivalency. 
However, due to hedging or miscalibration, the forecaster’s reported pos- 
terior probabilities may not be equivalent to those implied by the ROC 
curves and the underlying distributions. A numerical example of such a 
case is presented later in this paper. In this situation, if forecasts are 
taken at face value, the decision maker operates at a different point on 
the ROC curve than is optimal. Thus, in order to do as well as possible 
in the face-value EU evaluation, a forecaster needs to be honest and well- 
calibrated in the sense that predictions accurately reflect underlying 
strength of evidence distributions. 
Note that this argument might constitute an expected utility justifica- 
tion for using a proper scoring rule to evaluate forecasts. That is, if fore- 
casts accurately reflect posterior probabilities, then the decision maker 
would maximize his expected utility for that forecaster. Of course, it is 
not necessarily true that forecasts will be well calibrated in the sense of 
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reflecting the probabilities implied by the ROC curves even if they are 
honestly given. 
Although the face-value EU evaluation depends on calibration, the 
optimal EU rule is mainly a measure of the concept of resolution. It 
ignores the numerical calibration properties of the forecasts in the sense 
that it only makes use of the order relations. Hence, it reflects the ability 
to order the events so that the events for which outcome 0, occurs are 
all ranked above those events for which outcome 0, occurs. 
Another way to think of the two EU evaluation procedures is in terms 
of an analogy with the theory of the ideal receiver (Green & Swets, 1974). 
Both evaluation rules are based on the same ROC curve and the same 
underlying distributions. The optimal EU evaluation acts like an ideal 
receiver in that it finds the optimal operating point on the ROC curve. 
The face-value EU evaluation finds a point on the ROC curve which may 
or may not be the optimal point. Thus, comparisons of the optimal EU 
evaluation with the face-value EU evaluation yield indications of the 
forecaster’s accuracy in assigning numbers to represent their knowledge 
of the situation. 
Computing EU for a future event. The actual score yielded by each of 





decision maker’s utility when action Ai is taken and outcome 
Oj occurs, ii = 1,2, and 
the joint probability that action Ai will be taken and outcome 
Oj will occur, ii = 1,2. 
Thus, the decision maker’s expected utility for the subsequent decision is 






probability that action Ai is taken conditional on outcome Oj 
occurring, and 
probability of outcome Oj occurring. 
Hence, Piv is simply the probability of a hit, FA, miss, or CR, depending 
on i and j. Obviously, these probabilities vary over the ROC curve and 
therefore depend on what decision rule is used. The probabilities are 
estimated by the appropriate proportions of obtained outcomes for par- 
ticular decision rules. The marginal probabilities P, and P, can be esti- 
154 KEITH LEVI 
mated by the observed proportions of 0, and OZ. Thus, Pin Pj, 17, are 
all estimable quantities, and the expected utility is easy to compute. In 
particular, 
and this is estimated by 
(5) 
where 
N = total number of events, 
nj = number of events for which Oj obtained, and 
nij = number of events for which Oj obtained and action Aj was taken. 
Dominance in the optimal EU evaluation. In many situations it might 
not even be necessary to know a decision maker’s utilities in order to 
determine which forecaster will maximize the optimal EU score. It is 
possible that the same ordering of the forecasters would hold for all de- 
cision makers. Suppose the ROC curve of one forecaster dominates the 
curve of another, as in Figure 2. Note that, for every point on curve B, 
there is a point from curve D directly above it and a point directly to the 
left of it. That is, for every point on curve B, there is a point on curve D 
with more hits and fewer FAs. It can be shown that EU will always be 
maximized for the decision maker who uses judgments of the forecaster 
with the dominant ROC curve and the rule determined by the point on 
the curve where the slope equals the decision threshold. Intuitively, sup- 
pose that points b and d are where the slope equals the decision threshold 
on curves B and D, respectively. Point d does not directly dominate 6. 
However, f, g, and all points between them on D do dominate b. Since 
d maximizes the expected utility of all points on D, it must also do better 
thanf and g, and therefore b. This argument uses conditional probabili- 
ties. To make the argument rigorous, it must be shown that it also holds 
for unconditional probabilities, as in (4). A formal proof is given in the 
Appendix. 
Thus, when the ROC curve of one forecaster dominates that of another 
forecaster, one does not even need to know the decision maker’s utilities 
in order to determine the optimal EU evaluation. The forecaster with the 
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FIG. 2. Illustration of a dominant ROC curve. If  point d dominates all points on curve D 
in terms of expected utility, then it must also dominate all points on curve B. 
dominant ROC curve will be better for any decision threshold. Thus, the 
optimal EU evaluation is very simple and clearcut when dominance 
holds. 
The dominance condition only guarantees the evaluation ordering for 
the optimal EU evaluation, not the face-value EU evaluation. This is 
because if the forecaster reports probabilities which are not equivalent 
to those implied by the ROC curve, then the decision maker will not be 
operating at the optimal point on a curve. Hence, one could operate on 
a dominated ROC curve and still obtain the highest expected utility. 
Of course, it is an empirical question whether dominance will be found. 
However, it seems that in most situations it will not be unreasonable to 
expect to find dominance. For example, in situations where the event 
outcomes are very similar-for example, win or lose a sporting event- 
it is reasonable to expect both distributions to be approximately normal 
with similar variances. These curves should tend to be well behaved. 
In particular, if distinct ROC curves have normally distributed equal 
variance distributions, then they cannot intersect each other. If they did 
intersect, then there would be a point where the probabilities of a hit and 
FA for one curve equaled those of the other. If the distributions have 
equal variances, then such a point would constrain the two sets of dis- 
tributions to have the same distance between their means. Hence, the 
ROC curves could not be distinct. 
Of course, this result assumes exactly equal variance normal distri- 
butions. Although these conditions are never perfectly satisfied in em- 
pirical situations, the equal variance normal ROC model has proven to 
be very robust in a wide variety of applications (e.g., see Swets & Pickett, 
156 KEITH LEVI 
1982). Indeed, Mason (1982) found the model to provide a close fit to 
data from a large number of weather forecasting studies. Of particular 
interest is the relatively good fit of the equal variance normal model to 
the data from Murphy and Winkler’s (1977) forecaster “B.” This result 
of Mason is striking because a covariance decomposition analysis (Yates, 
1984) of this forecaster appears to imply substantial violations of the 
normal equal variance assumptions. 
Another common situation may arise where one outcome is much less 
variable than the other. For example, it might be that conditions for not 
rain are very unequivocal and therefore on the days that it does not rain 
might be quite accurate. On the other hand, the conditions which lead to 
rain might be much more ambiguous, and therefore these forecasts could 
have a high variance (e.g., Yates, 1984). In such situations all ROC curves 
should be skewed the same way and again dominance might be a common 
occurrence. 
Situations which could possibly cause trouble would be when different 
ROC curves are skewed in different directions. Such a situation might 
arise if one forecaster was good at predicting one outcome and another 
forecaster was good at predicting the complementary outcome. It is not 
easy to imagine such situations, but if they should occur it makes sense 
that the choice of the better forecaster should depend on the decision 
maker’s tradeoffs between different types of errors. 
Area under the ROC Curve 
The third evaluation procedure is to simply find the area under the 
ROC curve. This is essentially the approach pursued by Mason (1982). 
However, he argues that, rather than using the area under the nonpara- 
metric ROC curve, one should assume normal distributions underlying 
the ROC and use a parametric measure. In particular, he recommends 
A,, which is the area under the ROC curve when the ROC curve is de- 
termined by a best fit assuming normality. The important point is that 
this is a generalized measure of resolution in the sense that it takes all 
utility functions into account. It measures resolution in the sense that the 
area under the ROC curve is mathematically a measure of the separation 
of the entire masses of the two underlying distributions. It considers all 
utility functions in the sense that each point on the ROC curve corre- 
sponds to a different decision rule, or a different utility function. 
When the dominance condition holds, this evaluation rule will be or- 
dinally equivalent to the optimal EU rule. In such situations, the above 
results on the optimal EU evaluation justify the use of the area under the 
ROC in terms of EU theory. That is, when dominance holds, every de- 
cision maker will maximize EU by using the judgments of the forecaster 
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TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF OBTAINED OUTCOMES FOR EACH FORECAST CATEGORY 
Forecast0 
Physician A Physician B 
Mal. Ben. Mal. Ben. 
.I 20 40 2 10 
.3 40 70 5 20 
.5 40 40 20 50 
.7 20 5 48 40 
.9 5 0 50 35 
0 Forecast gives the physicians’ reported subjective probability that a tumor was malig- 
nant. Mal. and Ben. give the number of cases which turned out to be malignant or benign. 
with the dominant ROC curve, or equivalently, the judgments of the fore- 
caster with the larger area under the ROC curve. 
When the dominance condition does not hold, there are two views to 
consider. The first, which is the perspective of this paper, is that one should 
be very cautious in using the area under the ROC curve without domi- 
nance because different utility functions will be maximized on different 
curves. In this case the face-value or optimal EU evaluations should be 
used. 
The alternative view is to focus on the area under the ROC curve as 
an accuracy index and use the standard justification from signal detection 
theory. In particular, Green and Swets (1974) showed that the area under 
the ROC curve is equivalent to the expected percentage correct in a two- 
alternative forced-choice experiment. For example, suppose one were 
interested in the outcomes of baseball games. A forced-choice task would 
be to present forecasters with two games and ask them to choose the 
game in which they felt the home team was most likely to win. Green 
and Swets (1974) argue that since forced-choice tasks always require a 
decision, they are essentially pure detection tasks. Hence, they are an 
intuitively justifiable measure of detection accuracy. Thus, when domi- 
nance fails, the area under the ROC curve is justifiable as an index of 
detection accuracy, but it does not guarantee the maximization of ex- 
pected utility. 
An Example 
Imagine that you recently discovered a lump in your chest and would 
like to have a specialist read the X rays to diagnose whether the tumor 
is malignant or benign. Suppose Physicians A and B are the available 
specialists and you would like to evaluate the accuracy of their diagnoses. 
Suppose that data are available on past diagnoses of the two physicians 
as in Table 1. Table 1 gives the subjective probabilities of malignancy 
reported by the physicians, and the observed outcomes for each category. 
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TABLE 2 
HIT, MISS, FA, AND CR RATES CORRESFQNDING TO OUTCOMES IN TABLE 1” 
Hits Misses 
Decision ~ ~ 
P(hit) FA CR WA) 
~ ___ 
thrshld. A B A B A B A B A B A B 
.l 12.5 125 0 0 1.0 1.0 155 155 0 0 1.0 1.0 
.3 105 123 20 2 .84 .98 115 145 40 10 .74 .94 
.5 65 118 60 7 .52 .94 45 125 110 30 .29 .81 
.7 25 98 100 27 .2 .78 5 75 150 80 .03 .48 
.9 5 50 120 75 .04 .40 0 35 155 120 0.0 .23 
1.0 0 0 125 125 0.0 0.0 155 155 0 0 0.0 0.0 
0 Each row gives the rates of hits, misses, FAs, and CRs for physicians A and B corre- 
sponding to the decision rule, “Take treatment for a malignant tumor if the physician reports 
a likelihood of malignancy equal to or greater than the threshold.” 
The possible frequences of hits, misses, FAs, and CRs are listed in Table 
2. These results produce the ROC curves shown in Figure 3 for Physicians 
A and B. 
Now suppose that you consider a FA to be equally aversive as a miss. 
For example, you think it would be equally bad to be operated on un- 
necessarily as it would be to ignore a malignant tumor. Further, suppose 
you consider treating a maligant tumor equally beneficial to not treating 
a benign tumor. In such a case, we might not find utilities: U,, = U,, = 
1 and U,, = U,, = 0. Then, according to the optimal EU evaluation 
procedure, you should use the decision rule given by the decision 
threshold in (3). That is, be treated for cancer if the likelihood ratio is at 
least 1.24, since B = 1, P, = .446, and P, = X4. Since the slope of the 
ROC curve equals the likelihood ratio, you should operate at the points 
marked by the arrows in Figure 3. Thus, you should be treated for cancer 
.l .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 
P(FAI 
FIG. 3. ROC curves for physicians A and B of Tables 1 and 2. The numbers on the curves 
give the slopes of the adjacent line segments. 
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if Physician A says there is even a 50% chance the tumor is malignant. 
On the other hand, you should not be treated unless Physician B is at 
least 70% certain of malignancy. Using (5), the optimal EU for using 
Physician B is [98(l) + 27(O) + 75(O) + 80(1)]/280 = .698; for using 
Physician A it is [65(l) + 60(O) + 45(O) + 110(1)]/280 = .625. Thus, 
Physician B is favored by the optimal EU evaluation. 
Now consider the face-value decision rule. According to the decision 
rule given by (l), you should be treated for a malignancy whenever the 
physician is more than 50% confident that the tumor is malignant. This 
is the same as the optimal EU rule for Physician A. Hence, the face- 
value EU for Physician A is again .625. However, this rule corresponds 
to a different point than does the optimal EU rule on Physicians B’s ROC 
curve. Using this rule with Physician B, one would obtain 94% hits (or 
true positives) and 81% FAs (or false positives). Hence, the face-value 
EU for Physician B is [118( 1) + 7(O) + 125(O) + 30(1)]/280 = .529. 
Thus, Physician B produces a higher EU under the optimal EU pro- 
cedure, but Physician A does better under the face-value EU procedure. 
Hence Physician A is better calibrated than Physician B in the sense that 
there is less of a loss in EU from the optimal to the face-value evalua- 
tion-at least in the current range of ROC curves. However, Physician 
B appears to be better resolved in this range. Put another way, for this 
particular patient, Physician B is potentially better at differentiating ma- 
lignant tumors from benign tumors, but Physician A is better at quanti- 
fying the accuracy of diagnoses. 
Now consider a patient for whom surgery or chemotherapy is very 
risky. A FA would be very bad for such a patient. Thus, utilities might 
be r/,, = 1, U,, = .7, U,, = .2, and LI,, = 0. The critical likelihood 
ratio is now 2.48. The optimal EU for Physician A is [25(.7) + 100(.2) 
+ 150(l) + 5(0)]/280 = .670, and for Physician B it is [0(.7) + 125(.2) 
+ 155(l) + O(O)]/280 = .643. According to the face value EU rule, this 
patient should be treated if r > .667. Thus, the face value EU for phy- 
sician A will again be .670, but for physician B it will be [98(.7) + 27(.2) 
+ 80(l) + 76(0)]/280 = .550. Thus, this patient maximizes EU for both 
the optimal and face value EU rules by using physician A. These ex- 
amples show that the best forecaster depends on the relative values of 
the particular decision maker. Such a result is not possible with traditional 
rules such as PS. 
To find the areas under the ROC curves one could simply connect the 
plotted points by straight lines, as in Figure 3, and find the areas under 
the lines. Or, if one assumes normal distributions, as in Mason (1982), 
there are computer programs which find the best fittinng ROC curves 
and give measures of the areas under the curves (e.g., see Swets & 
Pickett, 1982). 
160 KEITH LEVI 
DISCUSSION 
I have presented three new evaluation procedures in the paradigm of 
signal detection theory. Signal detection theory provides a powerful per- 
spective and a substantial body of empirical tools for this type of problem. 
In particular, this paper has emphasized the use of an expected utility 
loss function and the ability to obtain natural indices of calibration and 
resolution, The calibration and resolution indices presented here should 
be highly correlated with the traditional measures. 
First, consider resolution. In this paper, resolution is measured by ei- 
ther the optimal EU evaluation or the area under the ROC curve. In 
either case, a high resolution score is obtained when there is some cutoff 
such that events which occur are assigned forecasts greater than the 
cutoff and events which do not occur are assigned forecasts below the 
cutoff. Thus, if we ignore the pathological cases such as assigning even 
forecasts to events which occur and odd forecasts to the others, then a 
forecaster is well resolved in the traditional sense precisely when that 
forecaster is well resolved in the present evaluations. 
Now consider calibration. Let us call the traditional calibration mea- 
sures “external calibration” indices. Thus, a forecaster is externally cal- 
ibrated if for a set of events assigned a common forecast probability, the 
proportion which occur is equal to the forecast. I will call the calibration 
of this paper “internal calibration.” Forecasters are internally calibrated 
to the degree they give forecasts resulting in decision makers operating 
at optimal points on the ROC curve. 
Suppose a forecaster is not perfectly externally calibrated for some set 
of events assigned a common forecast probability. Then, holding other 
events constant, a decision maker whose decision cutoff is at this same 
point would end up operating at a point with more false alarms and hits 
than would be optimal (or fewer than optimal, depending on whether the 
forecast probability was greater or less than the outcome proportion). 
Hence, if one does not have perfect calibration, then neither does one 
have perfect internal calibration. That is, perfect internal calibration im- 
plies perfect external calibration. 
On the other hand, if there is perfect external calibration, then the 
decision maker will be able to correctly choose the proper cutoff point, 
and hence will operate at the optimal point on the ROC curve, and hence 
will be perfectly internally calibrated. Thus, it appears that the measures 
of both resolution and calibration in the present evaluation procedures 
are directly related to the traditional measures. 
Note that these evaluation rules, especially the optimal EU evaluation 
procedure and the area under the ROC, can be thought of as measuring 
two of the most important components of Yates’ (1982) covariance de- 
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composition of P!? (1)the separation of the two distributions of forecasts 
in terms of the difference between their means, and (2) the sum of their 
variances. However, whereas the covariance decomposition simply sums 
the variance and the covariance components, the signal detection scores 
evaluate the tradeoffs between these components in terms of finding the 
optimal combination of hits, misses, FAs, and CRs for the decision maker. 
Thus, although these evaluations reflect the same basic properties as do 
earlier decompositions of Brier’s (1950) probability score, they may re- 
flect them in different ways and thereby offer different insights. 
The preceding arguments only discuss the signal detection calibration 
and resolution indices in general terms. Future work must investigate 
specific mathematical formulations of these indices. An obvious resolu- 
tion index is the area under the ROC curve which, as previously noted, 
is a measure of the separation of the outcome distributions. A candidate 
for a general calibration measure is the sum of the difference of the face- 
value and optimal EU evaluations over all decision rules. 
Such indices might alleviate a problem in decompositions of I%. In 
particular, a reviewer of this paper pointed out that decompositions of 
PS are surprisingly affected by whether one categorizes forecasts into 
fifths, tenths, hundredths, etc. These problems might be avoided in the 
signal detection framework. For example, fitting a curve as opposed to 
drawing straight lines between points along the ROC curve has been 
found to reduce problems in comparing ROC curves with different num- 
bers of empirical points (Swets and Pickett, 1982). Thus, the investigation 
of specific signal detection indices should be a fertile topic for future 
studies. 
Finally, let me note that the determination of a “suitable” loss function 
is not a closed question. The use the N-M utility functions has been 
emphasized here because they allow the relative values of the decision 
maker to be taken into account, and they have been formally justified in 
terms of compelling axiom systems (e.g., see Coombs, Dawes, & 
Tversky, 1970; Lute 8z Raiffa, 1957; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). 
Further, EU theory is very general and many other commonly used de- 
cision criteria can be instituted as special cases. Similar formal justiti- 
cations have not yet been presented for the use of Bs and other commonly 
used scoring rules-other than the fact that they may be mathematically 
tractable and give some type of index of performance. When different 
indices of the same phenomena give different answers, then one must 
carefully consider the justifications underlying the different measures. 
The procedures of this paper emphasize the practical value of the fore- 
casts to the person who uses them. 
In conclusion, signal detection theory is a very elegant mathematical 
model and empirical framework with a rich history of theoretical and 
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empirical developments in many fields over the last 20 years. My goal in 
this paper has been to formulate the problem of evaluating probabilistic 
forecasts in terms of the signal detection paradigm and shown how indices 
of critical forecasting abilities can be developed in this context. The de- 
velopments of this paper are by no means complete. Specific numerical 
indices and statistics must be developed for the procedures presented 
here. The precise mathematical relations between these indices and other 
scoring rules need to be determined. I am currently working on these 
problems. I am also planning studies for the near future which will utilize 
the evaluation procedures of this paper with real data and compare the 
results with traditional evaluations. 
APPENDIX 
The following proof shows that the unconditional utility defined in(4) is always greater 
for the point on a dominant ROC curve where the slope equals the likelihood ratio than it 
is for the unconditional utility at any point on a dominated ROC curve. I first show that 
the unconditional expected utility is always greater at a point which dominates another 
point in terms of probabilities of hits and FAs. After this, I show that the optimal likelihood 
ratio decision threshold does indeed give a higher expected utility than any other point on 
the same ROC curve, and therefore must also be greater than the expected utility at any 
point on a dominated ROC curve. 
Without loss of generality, consider Figure 2 again. Since the dominating points on D all 
have more hits and fewer FAs than point b, P$, > Pf,, and P$ > P$, where ek refers to 
the relevant point on D and P$ refers to point 6. Note that q = P$ j = I,2 since Pj is 
estimated by the proportions of observed outcomes 0> which are the same for all fore- 
casters-assuming that the evaluation is over the same set of events. Therefore, Py, > P$, 
and Py2 > P$'?. Now note that 
P,, = P,,,P, = (1 - P,jJP, = P, - P,, 
P,, = P,,*P, = (1 - P,,JP, = P, - P,,. 
I also assume that U,, z LIZ, and U,r > II,,. That is, the utility of the correct action is at 
least as good as the utility of the incorrect action for a given outcome. I can now show that 
the expected utility is at least as great for a dominating point as it is for a dominated point. 
u,, 3 u21 (‘3 
3 U,,[P:: - Pf,l 2% U,,[Pf, - P%l 
3. U,,[PT, - PT,l 5 u,,w, - PT,) - (P, - P%)l 
* pB,u,, - p:,u,, 2 P!,UZl - Pf,fJ2, 
3 P?lUI,, + Pf,U2, 2 p%u,, + PB,U2,. (7) 
Similarly, 
u22 z= u,2 
U*,,[P92 - Pgl a U,,[Pf: - P%l 
4 m, - P$,l 2 U,,[(P, - PfJ - (Pz - P$I 
e2u22 - PhU22 2 P?2U,2 - pL;,u,, 
P?2:u22 + P?2’,u,, a e2u22 + p72u,2. 
(8) 
(9) 
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t  I  
FIG. 4. Strength of evidence distributions. Points t and s correspond to points d and .f: 
respectively, in Fig. 2. 
Combining (7) and (9), 
2 2 2 2 
c c Pp u, a c c p;uli. 
i=l j=( (=I j=] 
And, the inequality is strict if either of inequalities (6) or (8) are strict. I f  neither (6) nor (8) 
is strict, then the decision problem is trivial because the expected utility will be the same 
for any forecaster. That is, CJ,, = U,, and U2? = U,z, then let U, = U,, = Uz, and c/: = 
U,, = U12. Then, the result is the following identity: 
P,U, + P,U, = P,U, -t P+& 
* (Pf, + PqJU, + (PT2 + PT2’,)U2 = (PT, + P$)U, + (PTz + PgU2 
2 2 2 2 
* c c p;u, = c c pf:u,,. 
i=l,=l ;=,,::, 
Thus, it is safe to assume that if the hit and FA probabilities of one forecaster dominate 
those of another, then the expected utility to the decision maker is strictly greater at the 
dominating point. 
Now I will show that the expected utility to the decision maker is greater at point d than 
at any other point on the curve D. That is, the point which maximizes expected utility 
conditioned on a given forecast also maximizes the unconditional expected utility. Without 
loss of generality, consider the point fon D. Both fand d correspond to unique points on 
the perceived strength of evidence scale. Call them .\ and t as in Figure 4. Thus, the slope 
at j’in Figure 2 is equal to the likelihood ratio at s in Figure 4. and similarly for d and t. 
I f  pfb and p$ are the conditional probabilities of taking action i given outcome j at points 
d and fof Figure 2, and h,(e), j = I ,2, are the density functions for the perceived strength 
of evidence distributions in Figure 4, then. 
Pd - 211 - h,(e)de = j‘h,(r)de - I^h,(r)de = PSI, - j’h,Wdc 
-x f I 
Thus, 
Pf, = Pf, + P, h,(e)de (IO) 
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Similarly, 


















Pfp = h,(e)de = h,(e)de + h,(e)de = P$ + h2We 
f s I I 
s 




P;‘, = P$ + P, ‘h ( )de 2e . (13) 
From the earlier derivation of the decision threshold in (3), it is known that t is the point 
at which 
hlWh2W = P(P21f’,), 
where p = [CJ,, - U,,lmJ,, - U,,] as before. Since the likelihood ratio is monotone 
increasing with e, it follows that 
h,(e)lh&e) > p(P21PJ for all e > t 
3 h,(e) > f3(P2/P,)h2(e) for all e > f  
3 IshI(e > P(PlP,)l’h,(e)de 




Sh,(e)deLUl, - U,,l - Pz I Sh2(e)deW22 - U,J > 0 I I 
3 PI sh,(e)deU,, I - P, I 
‘h,(e)deU2, - P, 
I 
‘h,(e)deLi,, + P2 “h,(e)deU,, > 0. 
I , f I , 
Substituting from (lo), (ll), (12), and (13), we obtain 
(p;‘, - pf,)U,, + (@, - p4,w*, + v$2 - @*l&2 + (PI’, - p&w,, ’ 0 
Thus, the expected utility is greater at point d than at point J Note that f  could be any 
point to the left of d on curve D. A symmetric argument will show that the decision threshold 
point, d, also has higher expected utility than any point to the right of it on curve D. I have 
now shown that a decision maker will always maximize expected utility by using the de- 
cision rule implied by the point on the dominant ROC curve where the slope equals the 
decision threshold. 
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